

Fiend of Wall Street, former AIG Chairman Maurice "Hank" Greenberg.

Paul McCarthy's @!$%# Pile, Middelheimmuseum; Photo by Uw Moeder; Creative Commons Licence
Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner isn't as bad as he could be. Really. At any rate, that was going to be the hypothesis of an article I started writing this week. The reason is, I had a memory of Geithner last Autumn when he was still with the New York Branch of the Federal Reserve rather stridently rejecting calls to loosen "mark to market" accounting rules. But before I started writing I figured I better check to make sure that he maintained that position.
Luckily for the purposes of the article I was going to write, it turned out that just last week in Senate testimony Geithner had been asked about it and he had maintained his position. (Although it's curious that his comments were written out of later versions of this story such that Google cache was required to document it.) He may not be the most sparkling public speaker. He may have made a variety of technical or political errors in his Cabinet post. But at least he remained committed to genuinely prudent accounting rules.
Whew.
However, while reading the news stories, I discovered that on the same day over on the House side, Representative Paul Kanjorski, a Pennsylvania Democrat, had convened a hearing on mark-to-market accounting rules in his Subcommittee on Capital Markets.
Yowser. The Chair of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, Robert Herz, got pulverized by Kanjorski and Representative Gary Ackerman, another Democrat, for having steadfastly refused to loosen mark-to-market throughout this current crisis. Now it's true that most of the loudest and shrillest partisans of loosening mark-to-market are corporatist Republicans in both office and in the media. Cocaine-addled con man Larry Kudlow has been banging that drum for months.. Republicans in the House, including the Ranking Member of the Banking Committee Spencer Bachus and Representative Gary Miller of California have also loudly demanded such loosening.
The hearing ended with Kanjorski threatening to pass legislation to force Herz to loosen standards. In fact, the pressure was so intense that the FASB announced the new rule after only a week. The Chairman of the full committee, Barney Frank, seems to have accepted it as a foregone conclusion. This is absolutely unacceptable. Democrats pressing for this, like Paul Kanjorski and Gary Ackerman, need to stop. Go-along Democrats like Senator Christopher Dodd and Barney Frank need to stop going along. As a Democrat myself, I can complain about the Republicans all I want but the fact remains, the Democrats hold power and it is only because of pressure from Democrats that this loosening is being rushed to implementation. At the end of the day, loosening mark-to-market will only allow the fraud that is the current financial system to be perpetrated, er, I mean, perpetuated.
Here's the issue in a nutshell. According to FASB Rule 157, there are three Levels of assets on a bank's books which require an assessment by the bank itself, the "reporting entity," as to those assets' "fair value.
Level 1 is easy: Market value. If you own a house, and you sell the house for $100,000, and you get cash for it, you know the fair value and FASB standards would require you to list that figure as the value of that asset. That you mark to market.
Level 2 is slightly trickier, but still quite reasonable. If you own a house in a development of very similar houses, all of the same age and condition but you have not sold your house, how do you determine fair value? Well, the house next door recently sold for $105,000 while the house on the other side sold for $95,000. Although technically that's a model not a market value, a mark-to-model valuation (your model assumes that similar houses in a development will sell at around the same time for approximately the same price), your model consists of observable inputs because real money changed hands in a real market for similar assets. For all intents and purposes that is mark-to-market as well because the model includes only market-determined inputs. You list the value as $100,000.
Level 3, though, is where the action is. Suppose there hasn't been a sale at all in your development for three years, well, except that one where the drunken guy fell asleep smoking and luckily survived but there was smoke damage and then he lost his job and the bank foreclosed. What's the market? Where are the observable inputs?
Well, gee. Problem. What to do, what to do? Turns out, the proposed new rule allows you to make stuff up about what value your house should be listed at. Since there's no market and no observable inputs except for that one sale by the unemployed drunk (and taking that price as a Level 2 input would push you into technical insolvency), you may, according to this rule, construct a model of UNOBSERVABLE INPUTS and then apply that model in determining fair value. So, what the heck. It's a nice neighborhood, the cat-piss stains on the living room carpet are well-hidden, there's a dogwood shading just your portion of the back alley, let's say it's worth $125,000.
Don't believe me? Check this out, directly quoting the actual proposed rule change:
Therefore, unobservable inputs shall reflect the reporting entity’s own assumptions about the assumptions that market participants would use in pricing the asset or liability (including assumptions about risk).
Got that? The Bank gets to assume what other people would assume about the asset's value, then list that as "fair value." But wait, it gets better. For clarity's sake, this is from the executive summary rather than the actual rule:
For example, the reporting entity could use an income approach, such as a present value technique to estimate fair value. The inputs to the present value technique should reflect an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date.
"Present value" is when you know the nominal value of something at some time in the future but you want to know what it's worth now. For instance, I give you a $100 cashier's check post-dated a year from now. How much are you willing to sell it for? In ordinary circumstances, probably like $93 or $94. However, in certain circumstances you might get $100 or even more than that if the people you are selling it to expect deflation to occur in the next year, that is, if the $100 check will be worth $110 in current dollars a year from now.
So. Put together the technique recommended by the FASB with the method allowed for Level 3 valuation: Banks get to assume what market participants will assume about what market conditions will be at some unspecified point in the indefinite future. Then they get to use those assumptions to spit out a number, then enter that number into their books as "fair value."
This is bloody insanity. It wouldn't be so insane if we had reason to believe that the reporting entities would utilize honest, prudent and empirically-tested "unobservable inputs." As I'll concede below, there may indeed be situations where Level 3 valuation is appropriate. Except for one teensey-weensy detail: If there's one thing we know from all this it's that reporting entities can't be trusted with models that they themselves create to serve their own bottom lines.
A little visit to the wayback machine, let's jump in the time machine and travel all the way back 11 months ago to a point after Bear Stearns had been absorbed by JP Morgan but before Lehman Brothers went belly up. The chart above, from the linked Bloomberg article, documents the the change from 4Q 2007-1Q 2008 and the dollar-total of Level 3 assets held by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and the late, sidewalk grate Lehman Brothers. Goldman increased it's Level 3 accounting by upwards of 50% to the tune of about $100 billion.
Thus. After the first loosening of mark-to-market in 2007, you can see who took advantage and to what extent. The only reason Lehman's quarter-to-quarter rate of increase was so low is that .... they had already packed as much as they could get away with into the Level 3 pile during the quarters previous.
In Dante's Inferno, Level 3, that is, the Third Circle, is reserved for the gluttonous. 'Nuff said?
And now the banks and their fronts in Congress think even those earlier rules are too tight? And they want looser rules?
Well, okay. I must admit that as I was researching this article I discovered that there actually are good reasons why mark-to-market might be hurting some banks unnecessarily and perhaps exacerbating a problem that could be prudently solved. And it kind of explains why lots of members of Congress of both parties are so committed to this seemingly insane project. It seems that lots of small and medium-sized banks, community and regional banks, exactly the kinds of financial institutions that are most important in a given Congressional District or state but NOT so much national or international players, many of those banks are using Level 2 rules when they should be using Level 3, in other words, they really are under pricing their assets to some detriment to their capital requirements. One of the best places to get fair-minded (even if somewhat self-serving but aren't we all?) argument in favor of looser mark-to-market rules is a site called Mark To Market Debate.
So maybe the FASB isn't absolutely insane. But still, this is the wrong rule at the wrong time because it is absolutely certain to be exploited by the WRONG PLAYERS. Wondering how Citigroup ended up with such pleasantly surprising recent results, supposedly, maybe, anyway, according to a memo by Citigroup Chairman Vikram Pandit? How about the INCREASE, yes, you read me right, the INCREASE in Level 3 assets carried on Citigroup’s books from year-end 2007 to year-end 2008? Look at the chart above listing Lehman as having $42 billion in Level 3 assets on their books, a bankrupt Lehman, and realize that Citigroup has $146 billion in such assets (listed on page 199 of the linked 2008 annual report, a big .pdf file), and then you tell me what your assumption is about what other people will assume about Citi's "fair value" sometime whenever.
Yeah. Right.
The simple and absolutely undeniable FACT is that the large national/global financial firms cannot be trusted to use unobservable inputs honestly. They use those accounting rules to lie, cheat, steal and defraud--legally, perhaps, but it's still lying, cheating, stealing and defrauding.
The FASB may in truth need a rule to assist the smaller institutions, but this proposed rule is an absolute outrage. It cannot stand as written because the literal costs of allowing the known fraudsters to legitimize their fraud far outweigh the benefits of allowing smaller institutions the leeway they need to weather this cyclone of financial crisis. It’s penny wise and trillions of pounds foolish.
I can imagine some sort of rule or rules that might allow some loosening only for those institutions genuinely and unjustly damaged, but we cannot have that rule apply to institutions that exploit that rule to inflict catastrophic damage on the financial system. One idea might be to restrict the rule by way of a sliding scale according to size. The larger a reporting entity is, the less it is allowed to use Level 3 mark-to-model accounting.
Another idea might be to empower a Federal agency (the Commerce Department hasn't done anything lately) and only that Federal agency, to either construct or approve the "unobservable inputs" and make those models public knowledge. So that we all know, investors, citizens, taxpayers, members of Congress, so that everyone knows what assumptions underlie the "fair value" claimed on an institution's books.
Senator Dodd's compromise seems reasonable, too. He wants to establish preset “breaker” conditions similar to the trading curbs on the stock exchanges such that if there are unusual, temporary circumstances in which mark-to-market is having pernicious, unintended effects, then the rules could be eased until orderly markets return. But all that is for later.
Meanwhile, back at the ranch, after his beating before Congress, Herz took a mere week to produce a proposed rule and it's set to go into effect immediately after the public comment period which ends April 1. Like THIS April Fools' Day, like, a few days from now, like another week. Like, things are happening fast as FASB. And lo and behold, the FASB website does not have a convenient or prominent form to register a public comment. In order to find out how and where to submit a comment on this monstrosity, you have to actually download the .pdf file, then read the whole damn thing and hope your eyes haven't glazed over and you missed it.
Luckily for Newsvine, I did that. Follow these instructions to the letter (remember, you're writing to a bunch of folks anal-retentive about details) and let the FASB know that the way to stop corruption in the system isn't to legislate the corruption into the system:
Responses must be received in writing by April 1, 2009. Earlier responses are encouraged. Interested parties should submit their comments by email to director@fasb.org, File Reference: Proposed FSP FAS 115-a, FAS 124-a, and EITF 99-20-b. Those without email may send their comments to “Technical Director, FASB, 401 Merritt 7, PO Box 5116, Norwalk, CT 06856-5116, File Reference: Proposed FSP FAS 115-a, FAS 124-a, and EITF 99-20-b.” Responses should not be sent via facsimile.
If, as is most likely, your Representative in Congress supports this loosening, or is willing to go along with it, write to them immediately! Strangely enough, this appears to be one of those issues where the wingnut right-wingers in Congress and their moonbat left-wing colleagues seem to agree. Witness lefty populist Florida Democrat Alan Grayson, on the one hand, and Senate Banking Committee Ranking Member Richard Shelby, right-wing Alabama Republican, on the other hand. That particular strange-bedfellowing has become so much more common lately that it doesn’t seem so strange anymore. And things are getting to the point now that whenever I see the wingnut/moonbat coalition emerging I’m going to just support the wingnut/moonbats until I have reason to know different. They may have different premises but their conclusion--The System is corrupt and seeking ways to maintain its corrupt benefits—is absolutely correct.
If you read or watch the testimony before Kanjorski's committee, I think it's clear that the FASB is proposing this rule only under duress, which means just a little citizen action may be enough to convince them to slow down or halt this crazy accounting gimmick. So.
Take.
Action.
NOW!
If I were to write to FASB on this issue it would certainly be contra the thrust of this article which amounts to the equivalent of Bruce Ismay and Thomas Andrews bickering over the design flaws of the Titanic while the ship sinks by the bow. Jack, if all we were talking about here with these so-called "toxic assets" were whole home mortgage loans which had been packaged into bonds whose yields carried appropriate marks based on the rating of the underlying mortgage the problem would be comparatively easy to cure as it was with the RTC model. But they aren't and that's the whole point of the TALF project. Until the securitized lending market (which accounts for maybe 40% of global lending) is revivified the economy is not going to sustain any recovery. You'd do well to go back and read my previous entries on this matter and also familiarize yourself with how bank capitalization is assessed(PDF).
The large firms who constructed this house cards are going to benefit too much from this change.
I know that's the major thing for you Jack, but the thing is the first task is to revivify the market in a downturn like this. Time is of the essence. There will be time later to institute some reforms in the market. The new pricing mechanism for this stuff will be made as the TALF moves forward but first you've got to get the players to buy into the game.
What does it mean to "revivify the market" in this current context?
Bill #2
The mortgages aren't the problem. The sub prime mortgages aren't the problem. That's small change.
The PROBLEM is the securitized mortgages/CDOs that were originally based on the mortgages but were then SEPARATED from them to get the desired ratings so they could sell them at higher prices and do it all over again (ending up with a leverage ratio of about 25:1). Because the CDOs were separated from the underlying assets (the mortgages which represented the houses), the CDOs were now based on NOTHING and so were worthless in the real world.
$1 Trillion isn't going to fix it. $2 Trillion isn't going to fix it. $50 Trillion? Maybe... but we don't have that much and China, bless 'em, will refuse to buy that many T-bills. (Which would then become the New Style of Chinese Collective Wallpaper! Get yours TODAY!)
The banks have to fail so the accumulated debt can be tallied EXACTLY and discounted.
Once that's done somebody in a nondescript office somewhere in NYC or in DC can hit that little green button on the US Financial System panel that says "Reset".
No they do not. I'm simply tired of arguing this point any longer. All of my articles on this entire mess are available on my column. I'm tired of plowing the same ground endlessly.
Ummmm Bill? I didn't say anything about "nationalization". I said they have to FAIL!!! Which means they don't sell the bank - they CLOSE it and parcel out assets to creditors.... if there is anything to distribute. Buffett called the CDOs Financial weapons of mass destruction - and they are time instruments - there seem to be about 3 or 4 years of them still out there ready to detonate on the World's financial structure! It would be far better to repudiate these things and close them down NOW that to risk the complete destruction of the USA and the World's economy.
And you may be missing some of the pieces to the puzzle'
http://www.truthout.org/013009T
The long detailed version:
It strikes me that reviving the market by making it easier for the carriers of bad assets to make those assets once again look like good assets through accounting wizardry will only revive the market until the house of cards falls again. In other words, we'll revive the economy, get lending flowing, and everything will be peachy until we realize, again, that the assets are actually not worth what they've been valued at. Which is what got us here, basically, to begin with isn't it? So is a market recovery based on this sort of thing worth it, or is it simply a means by which we can prolong the next collapse?
That's what I see too, ED. But success for a Congressman is getting out of THIS hole, then dying before it hits the fan. The choice seems to be between a bigger con, or the truth, with the truth being an admission that these companies are nothing but shell games.
Very good, Gillis. And Bill's article on nationalization is excellent.
Reads in awe. I must say I am learning alot here. Tonight I can honestly say "Get Smarter Here" has meaning. Thanks for all the information guys, and Jfxgillis, for the excellent article and monitoring of it!. ~*~
Another opinion piece labeled as "Event." Please edit.
AdipicA,
Discussion around the event is Kanjorski's eventful subcommittee hearing.
Doesn't matter. If the article reflected a dispassionate viewpoint with the author's opinion in the comments, this would be a "News Event." It doesn't, and no reputable newspaper would put an article of this nature in anything but the opinion section.
Reported as mis-categorized.
Jack, thanks for writing a somewhat understandable piece on this situation. It is so damned complicated as I'm sure benefits those seeking to maintain their privilege at my expense. Lest it be thought I am one of the uneducated masses, know that I hold a master's degree and this is just beyond my grasp. No not your article but the whole picture. It's all so putrid.
Lest it be thought I am one of the uneducated masses, know that I hold a master's degree and this is just beyond my grasp. No not your article but the whole picture. It's all so putrid.
Don't feel bad Ruby, some measure of the confusion is by design. Laws and reporting methods are riddled with tools for manipulations that allow money to be moved around on the balance sheets like a street hustler taking bets on three card monte. Now you see it and then it's not where it was. In the context of the AIG bailout and the too big to fail cries a little bit of history might illustrate that the problem is not inherently with the figures but the cheats and liars who keep juggling them to create unearned gains and dodge taxes. While adjustment to accounting rules might address some reporting problems it doesn't get to the heart of the fraud.
Cooking the Insurance Books
by Lucy Komisar, Special to CorpWatch
November 17th, 2004...AIG went to elaborate lengths to set up a shell company in Barbados, where capital requirements and regulation was minimal compared to the U.S., where American regulators couldn’t readily discover AIG's involvement and where, as an added incentive, it could move money out of reach of U.S. taxes. Some high-level corporate executives were persuaded to front for a company into which AIG could "cede" insurance.
Goldman Sachs and Robert Rubin
Coral Re, a Barbados reinsurance company, was launched with a private sale of shares organized by Goldman Sachs, then headed by Robert Rubin, who would become President Clinton's Treasury Secretary and is now chairman of the executive committee of Citigroup. A confidential memorandum, (which Goldman Sachs ordered investors not to copy and to return on demand) told why the company was formed. "AIG's interest in creating the Company is to create a reinsurance facility which will permit its U.S. companies to write more U.S. premiums. For a U.S.-domiciled company, a high level of surplus is required to support insurance premiums in accordance with U.S. statutory requirements. The statutory requirements in Barbados are less restrictive."
Redruby,
I feel your pain. I also hold a master's degree and I've been studying this mess fairly intensely since September. Still, it seems like something new gets introduced every time I pick up a new book, periodical or blog. As soon as I start thinking that I understand the language and the concepts behind the language, KA-POW, along comes Jack, Bill or Pamela with a new POV. I'm sorry, but it's just too damn complicated for the average human to comprehend.
You're exactly right. I'm a professional (or was until March 13th) in the field and some of this stuff is tough for me even. All of these collateralized debt obligations involving home mortgages were put together my math geeks, not business people. Greenspan said after the bubble began deflating that he had 100 PhDs looking at them and none of them could even figure them out completely. I'll have something more to say on all this as the policy front develops with the rollout of Treasury's Public Investment Corp. where I hope to find eventual employment and the coming announcement of the results of the bank "stress" tests but right now we're just re-plowing the same old ground.
Greenspan said after the bubble began deflating that he had 100 PhDs looking at them and none of them could even figure them out completely.
The true measure of a genius structure is being indecipherable, the Wall Street guys who created that web may find new employment by pricing RFP's for Pentagon contracts. *smirk*
Jack
In Dante's Inferno, Level 3, that is, the Third Circle, is reserved for the gluttonous. 'Nuff said?
I knew there'd be something in your article I could relate to.
BTW -- In Greenpagan's Republic beancounting is a capital offense.
====
Jack
The perfidious beady-eyed bloodsucking banker Greenberg image? Great. Henry Ford would be proud. (It's almost Easter, isn't it...?)
====
Jack
FYI --
Apparently another greaseball Obama supporter. @!$%#!
See: The Brief on Joe Cassano .
====
You think maybe Wall Street knew something last Fall we didn't know? Or were they just following the crowd?
The man with the gold makes the rules, of course they knew, long ago.
"Unobservable inputs"?
Sounds like my last romantic encounter.
Excellent article. That being said, it's really not that complicated. They're crooks. It went bad. They want to be paid back through the use of taxpayers funds and, not incidently, government debt. They engaged in fraud on a massive basis and assume that it is so massive that no one will believe that it is fraud. They over-insured everything and the house burned down. Unfortunately, they owe insurance pay-outs to about 35 people for every asset they have on the books. Even more pathetic is that they are going to get away with it. I'd move, but where ya going to go?
Even more pathetic is that they are going to get away with it. I'd move, but where ya going to go?
Some other place where rich crooks work in tandem with crooked politicians I suppose...
Jack---excellent work ---very thought provoking indeed. I wish I had an intelligent comment to make but my head hurts now from so much thought provocation. Anyhow, I'm glad that you're officially "off the schneid". Good job!
Lisa,
This is what made it all clear to me...
Jack,
I'm rereading EESAand it appears that it doesn't really matter what any of us thinks, or says, about mark-to-market; as according to section 132 the SEC has jurisdiction of suspending FASB rules. Or not.
SEC. 132. AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING.
the Commission determines appropriate.
(a) AUTHORITY
—The Securities and Exchange Commission AVINGS PROVISION
shall have the authority under the securities laws (as such term
is defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)) to suspend, by rule, regulation, or order,
the application of Statement Number 157 of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board for any issuer (as such term is defined
in section 3(a)(8) of such Act) or with respect to any class or
category of transaction if the Commission determines that is necessary
or appropriate in the public interest and is consistent with
the protection of investors.
(b) S
.—Nothing in subsection (a) shall be
including such administrative and legislative recommendations as
SEC. 133. STUDY ON MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING.containing the findings and determinations of the Commission,
(a) STUDY
—The Securities and Exchange Commission, in consultation
with the Board and the Secretary, shall conduct a study
on mark-to-market accounting standards as provided in Statement
Number 157 of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, as such
standards are applicable to financial institutions, including depository
institutions. Such a study shall consider at a minimum—
(1) the effects of such accounting standards on a financial
institution’s balance sheet;
(2) the impacts of such accounting on bank failures in 2008;
(3) the impact of such standards on the quality of financial
information available to investors;
(4) the process used by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board in developing accounting standards;
(5) the advisability and feasibility of modifications to such standards; and
(6) alternative accounting standards to those provided in
such Statement Number 157.
(b) REPORT The Securities and Exchange Commission shall
submit to Congress a report of such study before the end of the
90-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act
containing the findings and determinations of the Commission,
including such administrative and legislative recommendations as
the Commission determines appropriate.
construed to restrict or limit any authority of the Securities and
Exchange Commission under securities laws as in effect on the
date of enactment of this Act.
Looks like the SEC is addressing the issue, in favor of FASB recent rule changes.
The FDIC is the agency responsible for selection of a "Third Party Valuation Firm". Stay tuned...
Hi, Jack. Just got back here. I had actually read this last week and just didn't have anything more to offer other than the input you already had. Frankly, it's confusing to me. Mark to market is too restrictive in this environment. Mark to model is permissive in a booming environment.
I suppose I have to come down somewhere in the middle. So, perhaps a relaxing of mark to market (but not a free-for-all change) would be preferable. Seems that's the direction Frank is going. The whole subject gives me a brain cramp.
I'm an accountant. Mark to market is NEVER permissible as far as I'm concerned. You mark to historic value/book value (actual cost) with footnotes on the balance sheet/explanation on the 10K, if you suspect the actual current value is or may be otherwise.
The Words FULL DISCLOSURE should be engraved in EVERY CEO's forehead.
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